Research Article

Panorama of National Identification Registration in Kagera Region, Tanzania: A Case of Rubale Division, Bukoba Rural Border District

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Abstract

Tanzania National Identification Authority (NIDA) began registering citizens’ information for national identification cards (NIDs) issuance in February 2012. By March 2015, NIDA had registered more than 6.1 million citizens; 1.7 million had received NIDs. NIDs would allow government agencies to share information; facilitate differentiating Tanzanian ‘citizens’ from ‘aliens’ and link the database with those of other government departments. In this paper, I present six key events that precipitated the establishment of national identification registration (NIR) project in Tanzania and I use Bukoba Rural border district case to demonstrate that strong identification risks formalizing exclusion, leaving many long-term residents, their children and grandchildren permanently stateless. I conclude the September 11, 2001, or 9/11 event, coupled with technological advancement triggered the need for tight security and the transformation of identification procedures from demographic data to biometric database worldwide; creating new arenas for exclusion based on citizenship that could result to an increased number of stateless persons in the country and the African region. I recommend a continuous NIR process in Tanzania; conducting further research on the impact of NIR process in country, particularly to citizens, residents and refugees in the border regions and on the effectiveness of the proposed Personal Data Protection Act, 2018 in safeguarding sensitive personal data on NIR database and in public institutions’ and private companies’ custody.

Key Words: National Identification Registration (NIR); National Identification Cards (NIDs); Kagera Region; Bukoba Rural District; Rubale Division; Tanzania

Introduction

The Tanzanian government launched the national identity cards (NIDs) program on 7 February 2013. The first 46 Tanzanian NID cards were issued to senior government officials and high profile personalities in February 2013. The Tanzania National Identification Authority (NIDA of 2008) began registering citizens’ information for the NIDs issuance in February 2012. As of March 2015, NIDA had registered more than 6.1 million citizens of whom 1.7 million had received NIDs [1]. NIDs would allow the Police, Migration Department, Revenue Authority, and other government agencies to share information; facilitate differentiating Tanzanian citizens from aliens (foreign nationals and refugees) and link the database of the Registration Insolvency and Trusteeship Agency (RITA) with those of other government departments.

According to the IRBC (2016), by 2015 the government had made a decision that NIDs would soon be sole official documents for citizens and residents [2]. However, the government suspended the issuance of NIDs in March 2015 pending further allocation of government funding in the budget. The NIDA Director ascertained, the NIDs will be issued free of charge to all Tanzanians as the government is fully funding the project. As a pilot project, NIDA issued the first NIDs starting with security forces and civil servants in Dar-es-Salaam, Zanzibar, and Kilombero (Morogoro Region) residents on April 26, 2012. However, challenges related to forged school certificates and other shortcomings forced the authority to postpone the issuance date [3].

National Identification Registration (NIR) facilitates the establishment of a comprehensive identification database of a country’s citizens. Ideally, a secure and accurate national identification database, allows government planning departments to allocate the necessary
resources to programs in order to meet national development objectives [4]. In turn, NIR supports efficient budget expenditure and can improve service delivery. Government agencies expected to use NIR information for their daily functions include the National Electoral Commission (NEC), the Tanzania Revenue Authority (TRA), Social Security Funds and the Higher Learning Students Loans Board (HESLB). NIDA had registered 6.5 and 15.2 million citizens between 2017 and the first half of 2018 or more than half of the country’s eligible population [1]. However, what remain untold in details though are the challenges, opportunities, disfranchisement experiences and lessons learnt. I use a case of Bukoba Rural border district, Kagera Administrative border Region, to demonstrate corruption, disfranchisement, discrimination and human rights violation embedded in the NIR process in Tanzania: 2012-2018.

Why is a NID So Important?

Ideally, proponents of strong identification argue that NIDs provide proof of identity and empowers citizens to access basic rights, services, and benefits such as: bank accounts and credit facilities; right to vote, travel documents (i.e. visa, passports, work permits, immigration status); proof of identity in situations where defense in court is required; health insurance and services; social benefits; government grants and subsidies; education and bursaries; employers, and business opportunities; land and housing titles. In other words, they present that the citizens and citizens alone are entitled to these ‘basic rights.’

NID Trends: The Tanzania Context

Six key events explain why Tanzania embarked on establishing the National identification system. The goal was creating the National Population Register and the National Database where vital information for Tanzanian citizens, refugee and the legal residents could be easily and promptly obtained. First, on its regular meeting in Lusaka in 1969, the Interstate Intelligence Committee for the Eastern African countries, Tanzania, Kenya, Uganda and Zambia concluded population registration was a solution to curb illegal migration for enhanced peace and security in the region. At that time, Kenya and Zambia were issuing NIDs to their respective citizens [5]. Tanzania and Uganda, therefore, had to follow the same path. However, limited budget constrained Tanzania’s timely implementation of this resolution.

Second, Tanzania had to conform to ratified and signed International Covenants and Agreements providing for the Right to Nationality, including the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 1945 (Article 15); International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, (Article 24(3)); Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) of 1979 and Convention on the Rights of the Child, 1989 (Article 7), which proclaim for the right to citizenship to all persons. The third reason why Tanzania embarked on NID project was the need to control illegal migration from neighboring countries (Burundi, Democratic Republic of Congo – DRC, Malawi, Mozambique, Uganda, Rwanda and Zambia), some of which are conflict-ridden and the 1000 km (Tanga-Mtwara) Indian Oceans coast threatened by Somali pirates. In case of instability in some of these countries, Tanzania faces a huge influx of refugees (mainly from Rwanda, Burundi and the DRC). Recommending on the impact of refugees’ influx, the Gotham International Ltd, (2006) wrote;

“Some of the Refugees have overstayed their welcome by mingling with the locals and in the absence of the identity cards; it is difficult if not impossible to separate the Refugees from bona fide Citizens. This could have undesirable consequences, especially during elections when illegal immigrants could negatively influence local and national elections” [5].

Fourth, in East Africa, the NIR projects are statutory requirements under the East African Common Market Protocol signed in November 2009 and became effective on July 1, 2010. The Protocol, among other things, requires all East African partner states: Burundi, Kenya, Rwanda, Uganda and Tanzania to process NIDs for their Nationals. According to the Protocol, the NID is a document that would facilitate easy movement among the EAC member states, enjoying “Four Freedoms; namely the free movement of goods; labor; services; and capital, which will significantly boost trade and investments and make the region more productive and prosperous” [6]. Consequently, East African countries have to conduct NIRs and issue NIDs to their respective citizens.

Fifth, the so-called ‘tourist attacks’ in Dar-es-Salaam, Tanzania and Nairobi, Kenya on August 7, 1998 and September 11, 2001 in New York, Washington and Pennsylvania prompted a new international outlook of identity, particularly in the developing world. In the Dar-es-Salaam and Nairobi attacks, United States Embassies were bombed by alleged al-Qaeda and Egyptian Islamic Jihad. More than 224 people were killed (213 in Nairobi and 11 in Dar-es-Salaam) and over 4,000 others were injured [7]. The September 11 (or 9/11) attacks in the US claimed 2,750 people in New York, 184 at the Pentagon, 140 in Pennsylvania, 19 terrorists and more than 400 New York police officers [8]. The US suspected al-Qaeda a perpetrator. The then US President, George W. Bush commanded what he called the ‘Global War on Terrorism’ or ‘War on Terror.” “The US government increased military operations, economic measures and political pressure on groups it accused of being terrorist, as well as on governments and countries accused of sheltering them” [9]. The attacks had diverse economic, health, environmental effects and insurance claims in the US and other countries.

The US used self-collected evidence to convince the world govern-
ments that the Islamic militant group al-Qaeda was responsible for the attacks [8]. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) military forces and the US army attacked Afghanistan on October 7, 2001 a country believed a base for al-Qaeda. The Taliban regime fell to the Northern Alliance and the US in November 2001. President Bush further identified Iran, Iraq and Northern Korea as 'axis of evil' or dangerous regimes that should be destroyed to “deter groups like al-Qaeda or indeed anyone else who might be inclined to attack the United States” [8]. With limited evidence that Baghdad's government ever supported al-Qaeda; the US led the invasion over Iraq on March 20, 2002 and succeeded in controlling Baghdad within three weeks.

One of the findings of The September 11 Commission important for this paper's context is that the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) had, prior to September 11, failed to watch list two known hijackers who had entered the US at Los Angeles in January 2000. The alleged hijackers used their "real names to rent an apartment, obtained driver's licenses, opened bank accounts, purchased a car and took flight lessons at a local school; [one of them even] listed his name in the local phone directory" [8]. Similarly, the Commission reported FBI failed to handle a case of a French citizen of Moroccan descent who attended flight school in Minnesota in summer 2001 "where he attracted attention from instructors because he had little knowledge of flying and did not behave like a typical aviation student" [8]. He was reported to have traveled to Pakistan and received money from the 9/11 coordinators to participate in the second wave of al-Qaeda attacks.

Following the US President's call on 'War on Terror', the United Nations Security Council in addition to resolution 1269 (1999) of 19 October 1999, adopted, among others, resolutions 1368 (2001) of 12 September 2001, 1373 (2001) of September 2001 and 1377 (2001) of 12 November 2001. S/RES/1377 (2001) invited "the Counter-Terrorism Committee to explore ways in which states could be assisted like promoting best practices including preparation of model laws as appropriate, availability of existing technical, financial regulatory, legislative or other assistance programs that might facilitate implementation of resolution 1373(2001)" [4]. Hence, NIDs are vital tools in the fight/control against crime and fraud; as crime control machinery would be able to identify criminals by linking information from the biometric database to perpetrators' NIDs.

Finally, advancements in science and technology (ICT) and embracing e-Governance (since 2000) lead to the Information Communication Technology (ICT) Policy of 2003 creating demand for a strong NIR system in the country. Tanzania's partners in the EAC and the South African Development Community (SADC) had embarked on e-Governances that required organizational changes and new operational skills to improve public services, streamlining government bu-reaucracy, enhancing democratic processes, strengthening support to public policies and increasing accountability and productivity.

A national identification system was first envisioned in Tanzania in 1969, but its implementation was long delayed by financial constraints. However, Tanzania introduced The Registration and Identification of Persons Act, 1986 (to register and identify Citizens, Refugees and Legal residents); The Tanzania Citizenship Act, No. 6 of 1995 (that redefined who is a Tanzania) and The Immigration Act, 1995. Other Acts are The Drugs and the Prevention of Illicit Traffic in Drugs Law, 1995; The Elections Act, 1995; The Prevention of Terrorism Act, 2002; The Information Communication Technology (ICT) Policy of 2003 and The Anti-Money Laundering Act, 2006. The Acts, paved way for the establishment of a national identification system. In 2006, the government commissioned the Gotham International Limited to conduct a feasibility study and recommend on efficacious ways to embark on this project. One of the recommendations was the establishment of an institution that would oversee the implementation of the NID system. Consequently, in 2008, the government established the National Identification Authority (NIDA) by virtue of Article 36 of the Constitution of the United Republic of Tanzania of 1977, under G.N 122 of 2008 that took the role of implementing the Registration and Identification of Persons Act to date.

The project started in 2008 and citizens' registration began in 2012. Funding for the project comes from the Tanzania government and bank loans at a cost of TShs 9,504 to TShs 10,330 or $4) per person [10]. NIDA issues Smartcards produced by a Malaysian Firm, Iris Corporation Berhad with a fingerprint, eye, digital signature and photograph biometric data on it. The project targets all citizens18 years and above, residents and refugees and registration is mandatory. Citizens must present registrar authorities with one of the following supporting documentation to apply for a NID: a passport, birth certificate, education certificates, voter ID, clinic card or a Baptism certificate. The then Minister for Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation, Mr. Bernard Membe, said “[The] Ministry and the National Identity Authority (NIDA) [have] successfully put in place the system [enabling] Tanzanians in the Diaspora to register and receive national identity cards [at their] own convenience whenever they visited home [11].

**Observed and NIR Reported Panorama: The Kagera Region Context**

Kagera region, the fifteenth largest region in Tanzania covering 3.3% of the country's total area (885,800 km2), is located at 1°00’S and 2°45’S and 30°25’E and 32°40’E. Kagera is one of 31 administrative regions in Tanzania neighboring with all EAC member states except Kenya and South Sudan. Kagera has an area of 40,838 km2 of which 11,885 km2 are underwater (Lake Victoria, Lake Ikimba, Lake
Burigi, Ngono and Kagera Rivers and other small lakes and seasonal rivers. Kagera is divided into eight districts (Biharamulo, Bukoba Rural, Bukoba Urban, Karagwe, Kyerwa, Missenyi, Muleba and Ngara). According to the 2012 Population and Housing Census, Kagera had a population of 2,458,023 (1,205,683 males and 1,252,340 females) of whom 2,231,033 were living in rural areas and 226,990 people in urban centers. Kagera has a 3.2% annual population growth rate and a density of 97 people per km².

Kagera Region’s inhabitants have roots in pre-colonial Buhaya Kingdoms (Biharamulo, Bugabo, Bukara, Busubi, Ilangiro, Karagwe, Kihanja, Kiziba, Kyamutwara and Missenyi). According to Kilaini [12], Kamazima [13,14,15], other residents have origins in neighboring countries (Burundi, Kenya, Rwanda, the Democratic Republic of Congo – the DRC and Uganda) and other parts of Tanzania. Majority of the residents are Christians followed by Moslems and a few follow African religions. Major economic activities conducted include agriculture (cultivation of annual and perennial crops and animal husbandry using mixed methods, modern and old systems), formal employment, fishing and business within the region, the country and across the borders [12,13,14,15].

Technology interventions aimed at improving medication adherence utilized psychoeducation and other approaches (i.e., reminders, pill box, and medication planners) to impact adherence self-efficacy [16]. The review also suggested that reliable, valid and objective methods, such as electronic monitoring, should be employed to measure adherence [16]. Muessig’s group underscored the greater reach that mHealth technologies offer, particularly for more marginalized populations such as HIV-infected drug users [17]. Therefore, a strong understanding of the usability of this technology and its impact on medication adherence for use with PLWH is crucial for the development of optimal interventions. To date, most of the interventions developed to support and improve ART primarily employed text messaging while only few focused on apps [17].

**Bukoba Rural District and Rubale Division Contexts**

Bukoba Rural district, located between 30°45’ and 32°00’ E and 1°00’ and 3°00’ S, is one of the eight (8) administrative districts of Kagera Region, sharing borders with Missenyi district in the north, Lake Victoria and Bukoba urban district in the east, Muleba district in the south and Karagwe district in the west. Its headquarters are in Bukoba Town. Bukoba rural district is divided into 4 (four) divisions (Bugabo, Kyamutwara, Katerero and Rubale). The district consists of 29 wards, 94 villages, 415 sub-villages and 61,631 households with an average of 47 people [16].

Rubale is the second largest division of the four (4) divisions of Bukoba Rural district with nine (9) wards (Ruhunga, Izimbya, Butelankuzi, Mikoni, Butulage, Rubale, Kibirizi, Kikomero and Rukoma). Data for this paper were collected via observations and interviews conducted in Butelankuzi, Rubale and Ruhunga Wards as part of a bigger qualitative study in the Tanzania-Uganda borderlands (2017-2018). Four registration stations in the four villages, Nyakabanga (Butelankuzi), Rubale and Migaara (Rubale) and Ruhunga (Ruhunga) were the study sites. NIR process took place in Rubale Division at the time the research team was collecting data in this area.

NIR and NIDs issuance in Kagera Region started in April 2017. The Regional Commissioner (RC), Salum Kijuu, launched the project on April 19, 2017 and he was the first to receive his NID card, warning the “District Commissioners [DCs], District Executive Directors [DEDs] and Village leaders to conduct the exercise diligently and with maximum caution, considering that Kagera Region borders four neighboring countries” [17]. The “Regional Immigration Officer (RIO) Abdallah Towo told reporters that the screening exercise will be closely monitored to avoid registering and issuing the cards to aliens, threatening stern legal measures against those flouting the exercise” [17]. NIDA’s Regional Registration Coordinator, Hassan Godi, reported;

“During phase one that involved public employees, 23,190 citizens were earmarked to receive the ID cards but only 22,771 people, 98 percent of the target, were registered. [Adding] his office had received 15,376 national ID cards, assuring that the authority will work closely with local government leaders through tight vetting to ensure that only eligible citizens aged 18 years and above are issued with the sensitive cards” [17].

Data from district officials and the media indicated that NIR commenced in Bukoba Urban and Bukoba Rural in April 2018, almost a year after the launching by the RC on April 19, 2017. Interviewees from the four sites reported being caught unaware of the NIR in their areas. In Nyakabanga village (Butelankuzi), for example, a female interviewed on her way from the registration center reported;

“I was not aware that NIR had started in our village … My neighbor passed this information to me last night … She had heard of it from our ekyma [women’s social group] Chairperson living close to the village center .. Otherwise, I would have been left out” [16].

A male interviewee from Nyakato sub-village (Rubale) expressed “[W]e were not informed of this registration at all … Thank God, my son goes to school at Rubale Secondary … He got this message from his teachers” [16].

An interviewee and resident of Ruhunga village (Ruhunga ward) reported, “We were not informed of this exercise ahead of time … We
knew it from those who happened to register on the first day” [16]. Radio Karagwe, reported an old man in his late eighties (Katoro Ward) paraded his whole extended family (wives, children, in-laws, relatives and laborers) for registration demanding he would not like to die without them being registered. “He could not comprehend NIDA staff’s and village and ward leaders’ explanations that only individuals aged 18 and above were eligible for registration … The rest would do so after turning 18” [18].

Lack of NIR awareness among community members led most of them to confuse it with previous census registrations. “We thought the registrar personnel would walk around the villages registering individuals in their households … We were later informed we had to stand in a queue at the village center for registration … I registered on the third day” [16]. Other villagers thought the voter ID was sufficient for their identification needs as one villager in Rubale explained, “I have been using the voter ID whenever I identified myself … at the banks, airports and wherever I travel in the country … Why should I go through another trouble getting a new ID?” [16]. When asked why he thought registering for a NID was a ‘trouble,’ the interviewee recalled the experience with registration for the voter ID saying, “We spent a lot of time to be registered … The registrar personnel and the village leaders asked for and took bribes and often threatened some citizens by questioning their citizenship” [16]. A Muleba district resident interviewed in Butelankuzi reported village leaders collecting TShs 1,000 ($0.4) from each household for caring for NIDA staff during their stay in their villages [16].

Study participants reported the Village Executive Officers (VEOs) charged between TShs 2,000 ($0.8) and TShs 5,000 ($2) for an introduction letter to villagers who had lost their voter IDs, had no accepted ID or had just turned 18. In some cases, villagers who had returned to their home villages for registration could not afford spending a day or two at the centers; hence, they bribed village leaders or NIDA staff between TShs 2,000 ($0.8) and TShs 5,000 ($2) per person for a quick registration. The Bukoba Council Mayor and Rukoma Ward Councilor, Mr. Ngeze warned the village and ward leaders against corruption during the registration process urging Councilors to cancel other activity plans in favor of the NIR [19].

However, NIR was an opportunity to some villagers. The boda-boda (motorcycle) riders, for example, charged between TShs 1,000 ($0.4) and TShs 5,000 ($2) depending on the distance to or from the registration station. Villagers in Butelankuzi, Rukoma and Rubale took boda-boda to Rubale center (between 2.5 km and 7) to photocopy their IDs at a cost of TShs 500 ($0.2) per page or TShs 1000 ($0.4) per voter ID (two sides). The stationery shop/booth owners, particularly those with standby generators, celebrated fortune from Butelankuzi, Rubale and Rukoma residents desperately in need of photocopying services. They charged TShs 500 ($0.2) per page. Residents in a hurry paid up to TShs 1,000 ($0.4) per page. At all centers, some young and semi-literate villagers charged TShs 200 ($0.1) for stapling registration documents; TShs 200 ($0.1) to TShs 500 ($0.2) for correction ink per word erased; TShs 2,000 ($0.8) to TShs 5,000 ($2) for assisting filling the registration forms for illiterate villagers or villagers with poor sight to read tiny words (font) on the registration forms [16].

It was observed at each registration center the villagers’ turnout outnumbered the NIDA staff’s capacity to manage them, which resulted in standing for a long time on long queues. Coupled with the shortage of registration forms and underestimated duration needed to register potential villagers (fueled by electricity shortage and secretarial services unavailability) caused fear of missing registration among villagers leading to corruption incidences reported at the four registration centers. In addition, NIDA’s staff was reported being rude, demonstrating negative attitude towards some villagers’ concerns and uncooperative to the respective village and ward authorities. A female interviewed in Nyakabanga village reported “In Karagwe, NIDA staff ripped presented forms they considered not NIDA originals and refused to register individuals they suspected aliens” [16]. Radio Karagwe (April 2018), reported similar incidences in Kyerwa district [20]. Interviewees from the three wards observed, “There had been rumors that the government intended using NIR to screen out and finally expel aliens … Due to this fear, many of the villagers shaken by the 2000 and after operations targeting Walalo were reluctant showing up for registration” [16]. Other participants noted, “Members of vulnerable groups: the disabled, pregnant women, mothers with infants and the elderly were not given priority as expected and as directed by NIDA national authorities … They were forced to stand in queues for a long time … Some got frustrated and left” [16].

Furthermore, NIDA staff were reported accepting only the voter ID as a valid supporting document for registration as opposed to ‘one of the documents’ listed by NIDA (a passport, birth certificate, education certificates, clinic card or a Baptism certificate) and failing to keep promises (bringing more forms where they fell short of). Moreover, the process excluded hospitalized or home-bedridden citizens implying there are many citizens that were not registered. All interviewees attested, “there are many citizens who could not be registered for various reasons … It is unclear when there will be another chance for them to register” [16].

**Discussion**

It is clear that NID systems are currently in use, under development or strengthening in many countries. Proponents and nation-state governments, in particular, claim NIDs are essential for any person’s participation in a modern economy and accessing basic rights and services;
and empower people to vote, register assets, own bank accounts and travel. Further, the claim goes, adequate ID systems help governments to engage with their populace in a modernized and efficient manner and a fulfillment of the Sustainable Development Goals for 2015-2030 (Goal 16.9). Other NIDs proponents turn to rapid advancement made in digital technology, including biometrics and its incorporation into identification systems as another driver for introducing NIR to facilitate the establishment of comprehensive identification database of countries' citizens. However, data available prove that security particularly after September 11, 2001 was a key driver for this process. I argue and demonstrate, in order to recognize the potentials of ID programs for development, a number of concerns and policy challenges need to be addressed even as systems are strengthened.

In the course of redefining citizenship types (citizens, residents, refugees, immigrants or aliens) and rights and obligations attached to each type of citizenship, NIRs and NIDs are paving new arenas for inclusion and exclusion, intensifying boundaries between 'the we' and 'the they'. Citizens and state elite could use them for political or personal ends [13]. Before Dar-es-Salaam residents' registration for NIDs started at the end of June 2012, NIDA called on the public to expose people they suspect foreigners in their respective areas [3,21]. NIDAs Head of Information, Thomas William told journalists “the move behind is to get genuine people and the right citizens who are directly concerned with the national IDs and nobody else [3]. Describing the importance of the NIDs, NIDA's official remarked, “[there] are many uses [but] the most important one is to get to know one's nationality and the physical location including places of domicile” [3].

The Chairman of Mafuriko Street in Ilala Municipality Idrissa Minta reported in an interview with the Guardian Reporter that among the biggest challenges the local governments were facing was “dealing with those who looked like Somalis, but said they were Tanzanians... They claim to be Tanzanians while they don’t speak Kiswahili and they don’t have birth certificates” [21] as if each ‘Tanzanian’ has one! In Mara, the RC Adam Kigoma Malima;

“Warned all non-citizens residing in the region against involvement in the ongoing issuance of national identity cards and that anybody helping foreigners to get registered will be punished” … [Adding] “I swear, if at no legal reason we identify a foreigner in possession of our national ID in his pockets, pretending to be one of us he will face the full wrath of the law”’ [22].

The Deputy Minister for Home Affairs, Hamad Masauni remarked “Foreigners who have no proper permission [residing and working in Tanzania] will be flushed out and are forbidden from taking part in the ongoing issuance of IDs [22]. Explaining why NIDA staff demanded more than one ID, a Registrar in Mafuriko Street, Ilala Municipality, Ally Mshauri claimed;

“For a person to be registered, he or she must have personal documents which should be attached with the registration form, such as a birth certificate, certificate of primary education, a clinic card or certificate of baptism among others ... Our goal is to get the details which identify a person, to know if he or she is a Tanzanian or a foreigner” [22].

Describing the dual characteristics (simultaneous inclusion and exclusion) of strong identification, Gelb and Diopasi (n.d) wrote;

“Strong identification can facilitate inclusion but can also be a mechanism for exclusion. There are over 720,000 formerly stateless persons in Africa – a number that is underpinned by exclusionary nationality laws, but many other people have unclear national status. Over 20 countries have no provisions regarding a child’s right to nationality or a path to citizenship for those with foreign-born parents and only a handful of African countries automatically confer citizenship from birth to those born on their territory. Several countries still grant greater rights to men than women to pass citizenship to their children or spouses. Citizenship by naturalization is often almost impossible to obtain in practice and many countries allow naturalized citizenship to be withdrawn on arbitrary grounds. Half of Africa's states even allow revocation of a person's birth nationality. Strengthening NID programs, therefore, risks formalizing exclusion, leaving many long-term residents, their children and even their grandchildren permanently stateless” [23].

Indeed, if African state governments will remain deaf and blind to the exclusive nature of strong identification could greatly complicate the process of formalizing common nationality for a united and integrated Africa as envisioned in the African Unions Border Program (AUBP of 2007). However, recognizing the increasing risk of marginalization, the African Union has called for a Convention on African Nationality in its report “The Right to a Nationality in Africa” (ACHPR of 2014) and the ID4Africa movement is underway toward meeting UN Sustainable Development Goal 16.9 by providing every person with legal identity by 2030 [1].

Unquestionably, Tanzania and NIDA in particular, has succeeded in undertaking the NIR project. However, there are several issues and concerns that could be resolved by experience gained and from other countries. First, there has been a lack of awareness of NIR among the targeted population countrywide. The study participants in Rubale ward reported this concern. A Dar-es-Salaam resident who participated in phase one of the project observed, “This exercise [NIR] is not clearly understood by the public...Television advert shows that an applicant should have a birth certificate or a voter ID, but when you go there, they also ask for other credentials like baptism certificates” [21]. A local government official in Ilala claimed, “Many people could not follow even minor instructions such as how to complete forms and differentiate this particular activity from registration for
the population census” [21]. A registration clerk at Mchangani Street in Makumbusho ward in Kinondoni Municipality, Katembo Kitwana, ascertained;

“Lack of awareness was making the registration process too slow for comfort ... It took us some time to give them preliminary education instead of start the registration process straight away... Most adults have no sufficient documents, so we direct them to go and obtain introduction letters from their streets’ leaders, in events of suspicious documents; we immediately contact the National Identification Authority (NIDA) office for clarification” [21].

This was contrary to NIDA Head of Information’s story that “[T]he exercise [NIR] would be preceded by preliminary education to people, civil society groups and human rights activists on the importance of the exercise” [21]. Similarly, an inadequate number of registration staff at many registration centers; shortage of registration forms and consequences of using physical appearance to determine one’s nationality were reported in all areas covered in the first phase (Dar-es-Salaam, Zanzibar and Kilombero) and Kagera Region. One would have expected NIDA to have resolved such drawbacks before embarking on registration and issuance of NIDs countrywide.

Unquestionably, NIR is not a one-time event; it should be continuous. That is why the Minister for Foreign Affairs has assured Tanzanians in the Diaspora of registering and receiving NIDs at their own convenience whenever they visited home [11]. If this is the case, the question becomes, why did the government conduct this exercise in a hurried manner as it did? With shortcomings from NIDA, citizens had between three and four days for registration; those who failed to register were not assured of their fate and could not go for a second round, providing biometric data – photograph, signature, eye and fingerprint. The citizens got “the don't cut me off” [24] fever or “a do-or-die” [25] affair and a panic rush to acquire NIDs. This fear, in turn, greatly contributed to corruption incidences reported in Bukoba Rural and Kagera Region in general and left many citizens unregistered. The fact that the government had decided that NIDs would be the sole official documents for citizens and residents; spread this fear among citizens like the bushfire. The continuous registration and issuance of NIDs in the country could have solved these problems.

Some citizens were unregistered because they lacked identification documents required by NIDA staff. A sense of forged education/school leaving certificates and voter ID cards reported throughout the country perhaps forced NIDA staff to demand additional identification of applicants’ nationality, age and places of domicile. In some cases, applicants who could not afford to bribe the village leadership to acquire introductions letters were equally left out. NIR authorities in Malawi [26,27] and Uganda resolved this problem by putting the NIR, birth and death registrations under one roof. The transfer of births, deaths and adoption registrations from Uganda Registration Services Bureau (URSB) to National Identification and Registration Authority (NIRA) was effected on January 1st, 2016 [28]. According to Habasa & Natamba (2016), before then, registration of personal vital data was gathered under various laws by different government agencies, including the Uganda Registration Services Bureau, the Electoral Commission, the Directorate of Citizenship and Immigration Control, the Uganda Revenue Authority, various local governments and others;

“To harmonize and standardize the collection of personal identifying information of all citizens and legally resident non-citizens, the Ugandan parliament empowered NIRA to be solely responsible for and to share that data with other government agencies that may require that data. NIRA is also specifically charged with developing a National Identification Register of the county's citizens and legally resident non-citizens” [28].

Since its establishment, NIDA had opposed working with NEC on national IDs. However, in March 2016, the authority made a U-turn [29] finalizing legal arrangements to start using the NEC’s database in registration and issuing NIDs [30]. Reporting in Lindi Region, the NIDA Official promised, "Tanzanians who were registered in NEC voters' register will be given identification number by NIDA" [31] by December 31, 2016. This study, however, could not capture reasons why NEC database was not used to identify applicants during NIR in Kagera! Given the Tanzanian context, it would be cumbersome for citizens keeping a number of IDs: bank cards, driving license, voter ID, insurance cards, social security fund cards, worker's card and now the NID. Yet, many citizens find it a problem keeping and retrieving original or copies of IDs, certificates and other documents when needed. Merging citizens’ data recording systems to one or two could benefit card bearers.

Questions posed by the Victory Attorneys and Consultants (2017) on their website shed light on the fear of data safety in Tanzania:

“Can you think of data you submit during a job application, including copies of academic certificates, birth certificates, curriculum vitae ... How far are these data safe? Is there any legal obligation that those who receive this information should destroy them within a specific time? Can you think of biometric Voters Registration, BVR [and now NIR], how far are you sure that the data you submit are secured and they won't be misused?” [32]

In the view of the Victory Attorneys and Consultants (2017), Makulilo (2011), Nagai (2013) and Boshe (2016), there is no specific legislation in Tanzania dealing with Data Protection as the Data Protection and Privacy Bill of 2014 has not been enacted [4,32,33,34]. The Tanzania government, therefore, should enact the Data Protection Act to prop-
erly administer matters relating to data protection and privacy in the country. The fear has roots in the fact that with the liberalization of the telephone sector and introduction of compulsory Simcard registration, BVR and now NIR much personal and sensitive data remain in the private companies’ possessions; many of which are foreign and “there is a possibility that the data in their custody is shared by affiliated companies in and out Africa [rising] privacy concern [in the country]” [35]. Moreover, the fact that in late June or early July, 2018 the policy in Dar-es-Salaam arrested two persons in possession of machines producing several IDs and other documents used in Tanzania at throw-away-prices, including NIDs, voter IDs, driving licenses, school certificates, security fund cards, passports increased this fear among many Tanzanians.

Discussing on action needed to protect personal data and privacy, Gelb & Diafasi (n.d) wrote;

“National ID programs do not themselves need to collect and store large volumes of personal data, but the use of a common number facilitates the integration of other databases such as those dealing with medical records or financial status. The growth of such large databases raises concern over data security, data privacy and misuse of data by the government or private entities. African countries lag in this area – as of 2015, only 14 countries had adopted laws providing a framework for data privacy. However, many are catching up: seven African countries are considering the implementation of data protection bills. The number is expected to continue increasing as countries accede to the African Union Convention on Cyber Security and Personal Data Protection (2014)” [23].

However, the government stated drafting of the law started in 2009, but “Formalities for the law were delayed by internal and external deliberations …The law will provide solutions to problems stemming from rapid technological advancements [and] set appropriate procedures for gathering personal information where users will be allowed to access specific information according to available circumstances”[36]. It is too early for this paper to discuss how efficacious the proposed Personal Data Protection Act, 2018, will be to curb problems of data misuse so far experienced in the country and other parts of the globe.

**Conclusion and Recommendations**

Different internal and external events led to the establishment of strong NIR systems in many countries including Tanzania. However, the September 11, 2001 or 9/11 event, coupled with technological advancement triggered the need for tight security and the transformation of identification procedures from demographic data to biometric database worldwide. As a result, many countries have established, modified or strengthened their NIR systems conforming to the US-UN Security Council-set standards and procedures; creating new areas for exclusion based on citizenship and nationality that could result to an increased number of stateless persons in the country and the African region. Tanzania has been recognized regionally and internationally for its success in implementing the NIR project and NIDA’s blueprint is recommended for the ID4Africa movement toward meeting UN Sustainable Development Goal 16.9 by 2030 [1]. However, it is recommended conducting further research on the impact of NIR process in Tanzania, particularly to citizens, residents and refugees in the border regions and the enactment and effectiveness of the proposed Personal Data Protection Act, 2018 in safeguarding sensitive personal data on NIR database and in public institutions’ and private companies’ custody. Findings should facilitate NIDA to ensure that all citizens (including those unregistered) are granted the continuous opportunity to register and obtain NIDs as they turn 18 years.

**References**

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